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Introduction
Democracies include arrangements which facilitate collective or social decision 
making in the formal public arena (Cohen, 2001, p.49; Geddis, 2003, p.53).1 
These arrangements, established and supported by legal systems, comprise 
various ‘institutions, practices, and procedures’ (Geddis, 2003, p.53). They 
include voting rights, rules for the organisation of elections (voter eligibility, 
electoral or representation systems, electoral finance) and the framework for 
decision making by the legislature and executive (Cohen, 2001, p.49).
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The electoral system plays an important 
role in a well-functioning and legitimate 
democracy. Elections provide a pivotal 
opportunity for the members of a 
democracy to exercise collective decision 
making. Ideally, the outcomes of elections, 
and the social decisions that subsequently 
flow from them, should be accepted by 
the citizens as binding. That is, these 
outcomes and decisions, which affect 
all citizens, should be authoritative and 
enforceable. For reasonable citizens to 
consider themselves necessarily bound 
requires that they be convinced that the 
democratic process that produces such 
decisions is legitimate (Geddis, 2001, 
pp.11-12).
An important feature of the 
democratic process is the indispensable 
and permeating role of money (Ewing 
and Issacharoff, 2006, p.1). As the 1986 
royal commission on New Zealand’s 
electoral system commented, ‘[i]t is 
perfectly legitimate and, indeed, highly 
desirable that those interested in the 
political process raise and spend money 
to further their political objectives’ (Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System, 1986, 
p.183). Money is, however, an important 
determinant of political power (Alexander, 
1989, p.10). Its prevalence and importance 
in the democratic process raises public 
concerns about whether those funding 
the process are able to exert inappropriate 
or disproportionate political influence, 
thereby undermining the democratic 
ethos (Geddis, 2001, p.6). The familiar 
aphorism ‘he who pays the piper calls the 
tune’ alerts us to this potentiality. In short, 
money has the ability to make a lie of the 
democratic slogan ‘rule of the people, by 
the people, and for the people’ (ibid.).
To mitigate the ‘toxic consequences’ 
(Geddis, 2001, p.6) of money in the 
political process, many democracies have 
introduced some form of regulation 
for political finance (see, for instance, 
Alexander, 1989; Alexander and Shiratori, 
1994; Ewing and Issacharoff, 2006; 
Williams, 2000). A well-designed and 
reliable regulatory regime importantly 
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contributes to the legitimacy of the 
democratic process and, hence, to the 
binding nature of high-level social 
decisions that emanate from it.
The National-led government is 
currently reviewing the regulation of 
electoral finance.2 Consistent with the 
discussion above, the governmental review 
has stated: ‘It is generally agreed that 
New Zealand needs to regulate electoral 
campaigning and political party funding 
so that we can have confidence in the 
outcome of parliamentary elections and 
the integrity of our democratic system’ 
(Ministry of Justice 2009b, p.6).3
But this statement prompts the 
fundamental question of what particular 
principles and values characterise and 
inform the democratic system whose 
integrity is to be protected. These 
principles and values in turn should help 
to determine the structural composition 
of the relevant democracy in terms of 
the form of the particular set of political 
structures, institutions, practices and 
procedures adopted. Geddis explains this 
as follows:
Adopting a stance on the meaning 
of democracy and the nature of the 
voting system required to produce 
legitimate and binding social decisions 
has practical implications for the way 
in which actual, real world election 
practices should reflect these ideals. It 
involves making a commitment to an 
interlocking set of argument clusters. 
These interdependent claims about 
the world that both support and rely 
on each other for their validity relate 
to the function of electoral speech in 
a democracy, the appropriate part the 
government should play in setting 
up the rules of electoral debate, and 
the role of voters and candidates 
in the democratic process. These 
commitments support the legal 
rules that are applied to regulating 
the activity of different actors in the 
election contest. Therefore, we find 
that any debate over how the electoral 
process should be constructed 
inevitably involves having to engage in 
deeper disputes over the fundamental 
nature and purposes of democracy. 
(Geddis, 2001, p.10)
This article has two principal object-
ives. First, I claim that the current 
governmental review of electoral finance 
is seriously deficient in that it has failed 
to probe adequately and define the 
philosophical and ethical foundations for 
regulatory reform. The review has proposed 
seven ‘guiding principles’. However, 
these have been weakly developed and 
presented without an in-depth analysis 
of the kind indicated by Geddis. Further, 
the review to date has not shown how 
the guiding principles have been used to 
evaluate and justify the various proposed 
options for the regulatory system. There 
is thus a risk that New Zealand may 
end up with a regulatory system that is 
inconsistent across all aspects of electoral 
finance and that fails to measure up to the 
democratic ideals that are most important 
to its citizens.
Second, as a way of addressing such 
deficiencies, I discuss two alternative 
conceptual frameworks for viewing the 
electoral process: the aggregative vision 
and the conditional vision. In discussing 
the conditional vision, I introduce 
and defend Joshua Cohen’s principle 
of political equality (Cohen, 2001) as 
representing democratic ideals that are 
compatible with the conditional vision.
New Zealand’s review of electoral finance
Background
The present governmental review of 
electoral finance follows the repeal 
in March 2009 of the controversial 
Electoral Finance Act 2007 enacted by 
the previous, Labour-led government.4 
That act was responsible for a number of 
sweeping regulatory changes. The most 
controversial change was the introduction 
of significantly tighter regulation of 
third parties – that is, non-candidate and 
non-party political actors – wanting to 
influence election outcomes by running 
parallel campaigns.5 This included:
• requiring a person to apply to be 
‘listed’ as a third party with the 
Electoral Commission if they 
anticipated spending more than 
$1,000 on advertisements relating to a 
constituency candidate or more than 
$12,000 on election advertisements in 
total;
• requiring a listed third party to appoint 
a financial agent;
• limiting a listed third party’s election 
expenses during a regulated election 
period to a maximum amount of 
$4,000 for election advertisements 
relating to a constituency candidate, 
and to a maximum amount of $120,000 
for any other purpose; and
• requiring a listed third party and the 
Electoral Commission to disclose 
information about certain donations 
received and election expenses 
incurred by the third party.
Furthermore, the true regulatory 
burden on listed third parties was 
accentuated due to the Electoral Finance 
Act potentially, and in all likelihood, 
extending the regulated election period 
substantially beyond the previously 
regulated period of three months 
immediately prior to polling day (which 
has since been reinstated in the amended 
Electoral Act 1993).6 As a result, for the 
2008 general election the regulated period 
was more than 10 months.
The regulation of third parties under 
the Electoral Finance Act was widely 
criticised as representing a serious affront 
to citizens’ democratic right to free speech.7 
Much of the political scrummaging 
concerning the act was therefore centred 
on its implications for the right of third 
parties to engage financially in the 
electoral process, and this was the major 
cause of its ultimate rejection. Given this 
experience, the regulation of third parties 
is likely to be the most politically sensitive 
issue in the current governmental review.
The proposed guiding principles
The National-led government’s 
The National-led government’s discussion paper 
identifies seven guiding principles: equity; freedom of 
expression; participation; transparency; accountability; 
legitimacy; and clarity
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discussion paper identifies seven 
guiding principles: equity; freedom of 
expression; participation; transparency; 
accountability; legitimacy; and clarity 
(Ministry of Justice, 2009c, p.11). The stated 
aim is for these principles to ‘both guide the 
development of electoral finance law and 
be incorporated in the purpose section of 
the new legislation’ (ibid.). The discussion 
paper does not, however, elaborate on the 
principles. Instead, readers are directed to 
the government’s issues paper (Ministry 
of Justice 2009b, pp.10-11) for further 
information on the first six principles (the 
seventh principle, relating to clarity, was 
added at the discussion paper stage).
The guiding principles, as formulated, 
do not offer a robust, coherent framework 
for evaluating different options for electoral 
reform. In particular, there appears to 
have been no attempt made to date either 
to explore or to understand the intrinsic 
meaning and role of democracy in New 
Zealand. The development of an electoral 
process, including its foundational 
principles, ideally should take place in the 
context of discussion about the relevant 
democratic ideals and their implications 
for arrangements needed to support social 
decisions which will be accepted by the 
citizenry as legitimate and binding.
Without a firm philosophical or ethical 
foundation, it is very difficult to have an 
educated sense of the precise meanings of 
relevant democratic principles, how they 
should be weighted and how any conflicts 
between them should be resolved. The 
inevitable tension that arises in the 
democratic process between freedom of 
expression and equal opportunities for 
effective political influence is a prime 
example here.8 As a result, the immediate 
concern is that electoral finance reform will 
fail to reflect New Zealand’s commitment 
to important democratic values.
Application of the guiding principles
The discussion paper explains that: ‘The 
use of guiding principles is helpful when 
reviewing complex and detailed matters 
such as electoral finance rules. Such 
principles can provide direction and 
ensure comprehensive improvements to 
the law’ (Ministry of Justice, 2009c, p.11). 
However, leaving aside the problems with 
the guiding principles discussed above, 
there is no evidence in the discussion 
paper to indicate how these principles, 
or any other criteria, have been applied 
in developing and evaluating alternative 
options for electoral finance reform.
For instance, consider the two options 
proposed for the regulation of spending 
by third parties on elections (Ministry 
of Justice, 2009c, pp.32-5). One option 
is to retain the status quo. This option 
therefore enshrines the present, largely 
laissez-faire approach to the regulation 
of third parties. It implicitly assigns an 
overwhelming importance to third parties’ 
right to freedom of expression, while the 
principle of equity seems to have very little 
weighting. As the discussion paper does 
not evaluate the option against the guiding 
principles, it is not clear on what basis it 
has been proposed or how any trade-offs 
between the principles have been resolved. 
Moreover, the option would yield an 
internally inconsistent and inequitable 
approach within the regulatory system. 
Compared to third parties, the spending 
of political parties and constituency 
candidates would be tightly restricted 
during an election period. There is no 
obvious principles-based explanation 
provided for why third parties should 
be largely exempt from limits on their 
election activities while direct electoral 
participants are, by comparison, tightly 
controlled.9
Under the other option – referred 
to as the ‘proportionate regulatory 
scheme’ – third parties intending to 
spend on election activities above some 
set threshold would first need to register 
with the Electoral Commission. Each 
registered third party would then be 
limited in the overall amount they could 
spend on election activities during a 
regulated election period. This option is 
differentiated from the regulatory scheme 
for third parties under the Electoral 
Finance Act 2007 (see above) because its 
design would ‘be weighted in favour of 
freedom of expression, and be simple and 
easy to comply with’ (Ministry of Justice, 
2009c, pp.33, 34). Although the detailed 
design of the option is not provided, the 
discussion paper suggests some possible 
key features. These include third parties, 
while being required to identify themselves 
in any election advertisements, not having 
to account for and disclose the sources of 
any political donations they receive (ibid., 
pp.33, 35).
The proportionate regulatory 
scheme appears to be considerably more 
sympathetic to the principle of equity. 
It implicitly recognises that money is an 
essential resource for political activity in 
democratic states, and that the ability to 
control resources contributes to political 
influence. As such, the option implies the 
need for a regulatory system to impose 
some limits on the use of resources by 
wealthier citizens and, hence, curtail 
political speech. However, given that 
we are not yet informed about the finer 
details of the scheme, it is not possible 
to provide a more specific assessment of 
the extent to which a principle of equity 
may be satisfied. Moreover, the caveat 
that the scheme should ‘be weighted in 
favour of freedom of expression’ stands 
out ominously. Once again, the discussion 
paper does not substantiate – by reference 
to the guiding principles, or any other 
criteria – why freedom of expression 
should be given higher consideration. 
Not presenting any reasoning diminishes 
the option’s credibility. Additionally, the 
possible watering down of the scheme 
by not requiring third parties to account 
for and disclose political donations is 
similarly concerning. This would render 
the scheme largely ineffective. It is easy 
to imagine third-party front groups or 
organisations being formed to serve simply 
as repositories for political contributions 
by those seeking to influence the outcome 
It implicitly recognises that money is an essential 
resource for political activity in democratic states, 
and that the ability to control resources contributes 
to political influence. 
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of an election whilst protecting their 
anonymity.
Conceptual frameworks for electoral finance 
reform
In this section I address the issue of 
a conceptual framework appropriate 
to electoral finance reform. I begin by 
discussing two different visions of the 
electoral process: the aggregative vision 
and the conditional vision (Geddis, 2001). 
These two visions or models broadly 
cover the debate on electoral finance in 
liberal democracies. Each takes a different 
stance on the meaning of democracy 
and the preconditions for democratic 
processes. The aggregative vision supports 
freedom of expression as the paramount 
democratic principle, which is to be 
vigorously defended. By contrast, the 
conditional vision places less emphasis 
on freedom of expression, supporting 
a more egalitarian view of elections. 
As part of discussing the conditional 
vision, I introduce Cohen’s principle of 
political equality (Cohen, 2001). Finally, I 
defend this principle and conclude that it 
provides a robust conceptual framework 
for considering New Zealand’s electoral 
finance reform.
Aggregative vision
The fundamental assertion of the 
aggregative vision is that the raison d’être 
of the electoral process is to sum up (or 
aggregate) the votes representing the 
preferences of self-interested citizens 
residing in a pluralistic society, and nothing 
more. Put simply, political power is then 
given to those who have the support of the 
majority of voters (Geddis, 2001, pp.7, 13). 
Accordingly, the aggregative vision might 
be viewed by some as supporting a fairly 
crude or unsophisticated mechanism for 
collective or social decision making at the 
highest level of society.
Freedom of expression in the electoral 
process is upheld as being sacrosanct 
and generally not to be compromised by 
other democratic ideals or, indeed, any 
other considerations. The United States 
regulation of electoral finance epitomises 
this approach. In fact, restricting 
political speech in the United States for 
the purpose of curtailing freedom of 
expression is deemed by the courts to be 
unconstitutional. Significantly, then, the 
aggregative vision is opposed to the notion 
of fairness as an overriding value in the 
electoral process. Instead, citizens appear 
as free combatants or competitors in the 
democratic process, where they tussle 
against each other, with few constraints, 
to form or support a majority that will 
best serve their self-interests. While 
participation in the process is guaranteed 
to individuals through formal or negative 
rights that proscribe their exclusion from 
the process, citizens are not guaranteed 
substantive or positive rights entitling 
them to meaningfully or efficaciously 
engage. Therefore, under the aggregative 
model, one person one vote, a competitive 
politics in a ‘marketplace of ideas’ that is 
‘unruly, contentious, and bare-knuckled’, 
and the absence of any significant limits 
on freedom of expression represent the 
hallmark of a legitimate electoral process 
(Geddis, 2001, pp.12-15).
The ‘marketplace of ideas’ belief 
assumes that curbing speech harms 
democracy in two ways. First, it reduces 
the quantity of information available to 
voters for selecting the optimal outcome 
to maximise their utility. Second, it results 
in unjustifiably favouring certain social 
interests among the myriad of social 
interests when, as assumed under the 
aggregative vision, there is no such entity 
as the ‘common good’. These arguments 
provide the justification for the state not 
intervening in the electoral process except 
to ensure that the aggregate preferences of 
voters are accurately determined (Geddis, 
2001, p.16).
Conditional vision
In contrast to the aggregative vision, the 
conditional vision demands from the 
electoral process much more than simply 
counting voters’ preferences. It also 
expects certain standards and values that 
attribute to the electoral process a sense of 
legitimacy – based on some notion of equal 
opportunity for participation – felt by all 
members of the electorate (Geddis, 2001, 
p.7). It therefore presents ‘a “voting-plus” 
account of why an election is considered 
to form a legitimate means of allocating 
public power. Such an account requires 
that we broaden our concept of an election 
to encompass more than an opportunity to 
cast a ballot for or against some particular 
individual or issue’ (Geddis, 2003, p.60). 
Hence, bare-knuckled competition – of 
the free-market kind – in the electorate, 
together with a voting system to determine 
majority rule, is not the sine qua non under 
the conditional vision.
As a consequence, the structure of 
the electoral process and whether it 
is regarded by voters as legitimate is 
imperative. If the electoral process is so 
regarded, social decisions produced by it, 
though ultimately determined by majority 
vote, are recognised and accepted by the 
collective as binding, whatever the actual 
outcomes of voting (Geddis, 2001, p.20). 
The spotlight, then, is acutely targeted 
on ‘a wider process of public decision-
making, comprised of its own particular 
set of rules, institutions, and practices. 
These rules, institutions, and practices are 
in turn embedded in, and informed by, a 
broader “vision” of democracy’ (Geddis, 
2003, p.60).
There are, however, implications for 
the design of the regulatory framework 
around the electoral process. The 
framework must ensure that all reasonable 
participants can be satisfied that the 
electoral process is fair and just because it 
gives all actors the opportunity for effective 
political participation (Geddis, 2001, 
p.17; Rawls, 1999, pp.197-8). Moreover, to 
ensure its own legitimacy, the state must 
level the playing field so that no political 
actor is in a position to unfairly influence 
the outcome (Geddis, 2003, p.70). The 
electoral processes and regulation of 
electoral finance in Canada and Britain 
exemplify the conditional vision.
The framework must ensure that all reasonable 
participants can be satisfied that the electoral  
process is fair and just because it gives all actors  
the opportunity for effective political participation
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A principle of political equality
Cohen’s principle of political equality, 
which fits within the conditional vision, 
prescribes norms or standards applicable 
to arrangements in a democratic society 
for making high-level binding social 
decisions.10 According to Cohen, the 
principle ‘applies to the framework for 
making authoritative and enforceable 
collective decisions and specifies, inter 
alia, the system of rights and opportunities 
for free and equal members to exercise 
political influence over decisions with 
which they are expected to comply and 
that are made in their name’. (Cohen, 
2001, p.49)
The principle of political equality is 
stated in three parts:
1 Equal rights of participation, 
including rights of voting, associa-
tion, and office-holding, as well 
as rights of political expression, 
with a strong presumption against 
restrictions on the content or 
viewpoint of expression, and 
against restrictions that are unduly 
burdensome to some individuals or 
groups;
2 A strong presumption in favor of 
equally weighted votes; and
3 Equal opportunities for effective 
political influence. This last 
requirement … condemns inequali-
ties in opportunities for holding 
office and influencing political 
decisions (by influencing the 
outcomes of elections, the positions 
of candidates, and the conduct 
of inter-election legislative and 
administrative decision making).11 
(ibid.)
While there is an assumption that 
the principle of political equality should 
apply in its entirety to arrangements 
relevant to democratic decision making, 
in any given situation there may be 
conflict between and amongst the norms 
underlying the principle (ibid.). Where 
such tension arises, the implementation 
of the principle will require a weighting of 
the three norms:
the force of saying that arrangements 
for making binding collective 
decisions are to accommodate all three 
components is that, when conflicts 
emerge, we can’t say a priori which 
value is to give way. In particular, if we 
accept this three-part principle then we 
allow that we may need to regulate speech 
to avoid certain kinds of inequalities in 
opportunities for political influence. 
(ibid., pp.49-50, emphasis added)
The third norm of the principle of 
political equality – equal opportunities 
for effective political influence – mirrors 
the well-known standard of equality of 
opportunity (ibid., p.50).12 This standard 
requires that ‘one person ought not to 
have greater chances than another to 
attain a desirable position because of some 
quality that is irrelevant to performance 
in the position’ (ibid.). Cohen refers 
to this as a statement of the ‘concept of 
equal opportunity’, noting that ‘different 
conceptions of equal opportunity are 
distinguished by the interpretations 
they give to “irrelevant to performance”’ 
(ibid.). Using Rawls’ conception of equal 
opportunity, ‘irrelevant to performance in 
the position’ means that the only factors 
that ought to be considered relevant 
to attaining positions of interest are a 
person’s motivation to succeed and their 
ability to perform in the position (ibid.; 
Rawls, 1999, p.197).
In the domain of politics, ‘the relevant 
position is active citizen in the formal 
arrangements of binding collective 
decision making’ (Cohen, 2001, p.50). 
Those who are equally motivated and 
able to participate as active citizens in 
the formal arrangements of binding 
collective decision making should have 
identical chances to wield influence 
(ibid.). In particular, this conception of 
equal opportunity requires that economic 
status be excluded as a relevant factor in 
the electoral process and that political 
finance be regulated if the legitimacy of the 
democratic process is to obtain (Geddis, 
2001, p.20; Rawls, 1999, pp.197-8).
In defence of the principle of political 
equality
A significant argument for the view that 
the government should have limited 
involvement in the electoral process and 
there should be a right to unrestricted 
political speech (the aggregative vision) 
emerges from the belief that curtailing 
freedom of expression strikes at the 
heart of democracy because it disengages 
citizens from the democratic process 
(Cohen, 2001, pp.69-70). Crucial to this 
viewpoint is the notion of the inherent 
role of individual responsibility in a 
democracy. Individual responsibility 
involves each person having the right 
to decide for him or herself how much 
information they need in the democratic 
process and whether the information is 
reliable (ibid., p.70). This contingency of 
individual political responsibility implies 
that restricting the quantity of speech in 
the process of collective decision making 
is antithetical to a proper and fundamental 
conception of democracy.
Although persuasive, this argument 
may be challenged by applying moral 
reasoning which pits it squarely against 
the norm of equal opportunities for 
political influence. Central to this counter-
argument is the question of how citizens 
ought to be properly regarded within the 
democratic process (Cohen, 2001, p.72). 
The critical analysis begins by observing 
that the argument against restriction 
of free speech adopts a narrow view of 
the citizen’s role in a democracy (and, 
hence, a narrow conception of democracy 
itself). Consistent with the élite theories 
of democracy, citizens’ interests are 
prioritised on the basis that they can 
be met entirely through their role as 
members of an audience. Citizens are an 
audience absorbing the messages of élite 
political competitors, rather than political 
actors constructively participating in the 
political process by contributing to the 
content (ibid.).13
Individual responsibility involves each person 
having the right to decide for him or herself how 
much information they need in the democratic 
process and whether the information is reliable
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An alternative view – supported by 
Cohen as a more accurate account of 
political sociology – casts citizens as 
having a substantially more expansive 
role in the democratic process. This view 
leads naturally to a broader conception 
of democracy. Citizens are not only an 
audience for élite political actors, but also 
bona fide participants in the democratic 
process, expressing themselves through 
speech and action. They are seen more 
sanguinely as capable, if they wish, of 
effectively influencing political discourse 
(Cohen, 2001, p.72; Geddis, 2001, p.20).
This account of political sociology 
was supported by Hannah Arendt. Arendt 
asserted that human plurality is the basic 
condition of both action and speech 
Arendt, 1998, pp.7, 175). And it is through 
speech and action that human beings have 
the means to expose their distinctness 
(ibid., p.176). Moreover, the initiative of 
speech and action is inseparable from 
what it means to be human (ibid.). But 
this view of human beings as both speakers 
and actors in a pluralistic society requires 
citizens to be granted equal opportunities 
for effective political influence.
Arendt reminds us of another 
important consideration in thinking 
about the normative ideal of democracy. 
Participatory democracy is vital in her 
interpretation of the concept of power 
and ongoing survival of the public realm. 
For Arendt the public realm is held 
together by the dynamic of action and 
speech – the prerequisite for all forms of 
political organisation. And action and 
speech are made possible only by the 
proximity of human beings in the space of 
appearance (ibid., pp.200-1). The danger 
for democracy is disappearance of human 
power – presenting as collective action 
and speech – leading to the destruction 
of political communities, and democracy 
itself. Hence, Thomas Jefferson ‘had at 
least a foreboding of how dangerous it 
might be to allow the people a share in 
public power without providing them at 
the same time with more public space than 
the ballot box and with more opportunity 
to make their voices heard in public than 
election day’ (Arendt, 2006, p.245).
As well as being compatible with a 
wider conception of democracy, a goal 
of equalising opportunities for political 
influence is supported by principles of 
justice. John Rawls and Michael Walzer 
are particularly influential here. Rawls 
(1999, p.197) believed that measures are 
needed to safeguard ‘a fair opportunity to 
take part in and to influence the political 
process’. Importantly for electoral finance 
regulation, Rawls considered that the 
familiar democratic principle ‘one person 
one vote’ may not provide enough 
protection against the unfair exclusion of 
some members of society from the political 
forum because of the political system’s 
reliance on private sector funding.14 For 
Rawls, a just constitutional system – that 
is, one based on the fulfilment of the 
principle of participation – is prevented 
when the demands of the prevailing 
interests overpower the political forum 
(ibid., p.199).
Walzer’s proposed regime of complex 
equality limits the mobility of each social 
good to its own distributive sphere. This 
implies that the acquisition of a social 
good should not lead to a situation of 
dominance: that is, the possession of 
one social good belonging to its own 
distributive sphere cannot be converted 
into dominance over other social goods 
attached to their respective distributive 
spheres. In the case of electoral finance, this 
means that citizen A’s wealth – acquired, 
say, in the sphere of the market economy 
– should not be allowed to become a 
dominant good such that it provides him 
or her with an advantage over citizen B in 
the sphere of politics (Walzer, 1983, p.298). 
According to Walzer’s thesis, this stipulates 
democracy as the system of social 
organisation where politics is the domain 
of action and speech. The political sphere 
is therefore immune to social goods that 
rightly belong to, and whose influences 
are restricted within, other distributive 
spheres: ‘Citizens come into the forum 
with nothing but their arguments. All 
non-political goods have to be deposited 
outside: weapons and wallets, titles and 
degrees’. This represents ‘complex equality 
in the political sphere’: the opportunity for 
all citizens to participate in the political 
forum which affects their lives is equalised 
(ibid., pp.304, 310).
The ideal of a broad-based democracy 
is jeopardised by the potential for wealth 
to influence politics. Walzer (1983, p.310) 
observed that the deprivation of power 
in the United States is largely caused by 
the controlling influence of money in the 
sphere of politics. Similarly, Geddis (2001, 
pp.6, 20) noted that a significant, and most 
unjustifiable, reason for inequalities in the 
power of social actors is the relatively higher 
wealth possessed by some participants, and 
suggested that this is a major concern for 
democracy. And Alexander and Shiratori 
(1994, p.1) have written about the conversion 
of economic power into political power by 
those who are more economically privileged. 
The repercussions for healthy democracy 
(and, hence, for citizenship), both immediate 
and generational, are damaging, as Walzer 
warns:
The endless spectacle of property/
power, the political success story of 
the rich, enacted and re-enacted on 
every social stage, has over time a 
deep and pervasive effect. Citizens 
without money come to share a 
profound conviction that politics 
offers them no hope at all. This is a 
kind of practical knowledge that they 
learn from experience and pass on to 
their children. With it comes passivity, 
deference, and resentment. (Walzer, 
1983, pp.310-11)
Conclusion
The current governmental review of 
electoral finance regulation in New 
Zealand is taking place in a philosophical 
and ethical vacuum. This calls for taking 
a position on the meaning of democracy 
and the nature of the corresponding 
electoral process needed to ensure that 
social decisions made at the highest level 
of society are perceived by the citizenry 
as being legitimate and binding. In the 
absence of such a framework, there is a 
risk that the resulting regulation will not 
be consistent with the democratic ideals 
which most New Zealanders uphold. 
Further, there is the likelihood that the 
reform will not be internally consistent 
and equitable across all aspects of electoral 
finance, or across all participants in the 
democratic process.
The aggregative and conditional 
visions of the electoral process provide 
two opposed conceptual frameworks for 
electoral finance reform. As discussed, 
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Cohen’s principle of political equality, 
which fits within the conditional vision, 
is compatible with realising the fullest 
potential of democracy, including the 
potentiality of all citizens to meaningfully 
engage as actors in the electoral process. 
Moreover, it is cognisant of principles of 
justice. Further, the principle of political 
equality is consistent with the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990, which provides 
that ‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom 
of expression, including the freedom to 
seek, receive, and impart information and 
opinions of any kind in any form’ but that 
this right may be limited where doing so 
‘can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society’.15
Implementing the principle of 
political equality, in particular the norm 
of equal opportunities for political 
influence, implies that the role of money 
in the electoral process should be tightly 
regulated, despite the effect of reducing the 
quantity of political speech. In particular, 
it requires proper and thoroughgoing 
regulation of the expenditures of third 
parties, as is the case in Canada and 
Britain.
1  I would like to thank Jonathan Boston, Andrew Geddis and 
Paul Harris for their helpful comments on earlier versions of 
this article.
2  The governmental review was launched on 1 April 2009 
with the release of a scope paper (Ministry of Justice, 
2009a). This was followed by an issues paper released for 
consultation on 22 May 2009 (Ministry of Justice, 2009b). 
A discussion paper containing the government’s proposals 
was then released for consultation on 28 September 
(Ministry of Justice, 2009c). The final part of the review 
– the legislative stage – is now under way. New electoral 
finance law is expected to be passed by the end of 2010 to 
take effect in time for the 2011 general election.
3  This is essentially reiterated in the foreword to the issues 
paper (Ministry of Justice, 2009b, p.2), where the minister 
of justice, Simon Power, wrote: ‘Electoral finance law is 
central to the integrity of New Zealand’s democratic system.’ 
The minister’s statement is repeated in his foreword in the 
discussion paper (Ministry of Justice, 2009c, p.3).
4  The current (interim) regulatory regime for electoral finance 
is, once again, largely contained in the Electoral Act 1993 
(as amended on 1 March 2009).
5  Despite the Electoral Finance Act having been repealed, 
many of the regulatory changes it made have been retained 
in the interim regime. That said, the treatment of third 
parties has reverted to the largely laissez-faire approach 
that existed before the act. This approach means that third 
parties are only indirectly constrained in how much they 
may spend on advertising that specifically supports, or 
appears to support, the election of a candidate or a political 
party. Positive advertising of this kind must first in effect 
be authorised by the candidate or party being promoted by 
the advertising and, as a result, be accounted for within the 
candidate’s or party’s election spending limit. Third parties 
are unrestricted in how much they may spend on other 
forms of parallel campaigning, such as negative (‘attack’) 
advertising or issue advocacy.
6  The Electoral Finance Act required that where a general 
election is held in the year in which Parliament is due 
to expire, the regulated period is the longer of the period 
beginning on 1 January of that year and ending with the 
close of polling day, or the period beginning three months 
before polling day and ending with the close of polling day.
7  It appears that anger generated by the Electoral Finance Act 
is slow to dissipate in some quarters, particularly in regard 
to the effects on the rights of third parties. For example, 
an editorial in a leading newspaper commented: ‘Labour’s 
Electoral Finance Act was an anti-democratic disgrace. One 
of its worst features was curtailing the rights of those who 
wanted to spend their own money throughout an entire 
election year in trying to gain a particular outcome’ (‘Caped 
crusader’s plan flawed’, Dominion Post, 2 October 2009, 
p.B4).
8  Ewing and Issacharoff (2006, p.7) have posed this 
dilemma in the form of the following question: ‘Where is the 
ideological centre of gravity in the event of conflict?’
9  The lack of consistency in this regard was not lost on the 
1986 Royal Commission on the Electoral System: ‘In the 
same way that limiting spending by candidates is illogical 
if parties are not similarly restricted, it is illogical to limit 
spending by parties if other interests are not also controlled. 
Supporters or opponents of a party or candidate should not 
be able to promote their views without restriction merely by 
forming campaign organisations “unaffiliated” to any party 
or candidate contesting the election. Nor should powerful or 
wealthy interest groups be able to spend without restriction 
during an election campaign while those most directly 
involved are restricted’ (Royal Commission on the Electoral 
System, 1986, p.193).
10  This principle is consistent with John Rawls’ ‘liberties of 
equal citizenship’ (Rawls, 1999, p.173). To be sure, a 
principle of political equality is not the only prerequisite 
for ensuring that a system of collective decision making is 
binding. Further relevant requirements are that decisions 
be fundamentally just in accordance with some suitable 
notion of justice, and that they promote the general welfare. 
Nonetheless, the standards established by a principle of 
political equality will typically subordinate other factors, with 
the exception of the most basic precepts of justice (Cohen, 
2001, p.49).
11  It may be arguable, at least prima facie, that the second 
part of the principle (equally weighted votes) forms a 
subset of the third part (equal opportunities for effective 
political influence). Although Cohen does not clarify this, 
my interpretation is that the two parts should be viewed as 
mutually exclusive, for the following reason. The second part 
is in my view equivalent to the familiar democratic notion of 
‘one person one vote’. However, satisfying this notion should 
not imply that the third part necessarily holds. For instance, 
unequal opportunities for effective political influence on the 
part of the constituents of a society due to, say, differences 
in the holdings of wealth, are a valid concern despite an 
electoral system that mandates equally weighted votes.
12  It also corresponds with Rawls’ principle of (equal) 
participation (Rawls, 1999, pp.194-5).
13  For an early discussion of an élite theory of democracy, see 
Schumpeter (1987, chapter 22).
14  The Royal Commission on the Electoral System came to 
the same conclusion, noting that this requires that electoral 
finance should not be ‘completely uncontrolled’ (Royal 
Commission on the Electoral System, 1986, pp.7, 183).
15  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, sections 14 and 5.
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